Stackelberg-Nash Equilibrium in competitive facility location game among a franchisor and two investors

Stackelberg-Nash Equilibrium in competitive facility location game among a franchisor and two investors

Blog Article

In the competitive location problems, the matter of the optimal location of single or multiple facilities are in a condition in which competitors exist as well.This paper deals with a type of a competitive location on which a leader possibly uses the investment of other investors through concession and receives a percentage of their income.He also can place his own facilities on potential locations that are available.In fact there are three decision-makers, one as a leader, Bar Sets others as followers who get in the game of facility location for placing their facilities.The location of facilities is a simultaneous game in which decisions are made in two levels, in the first level they IRON FACTORS -B12 are asynchronous and sequential, in the second level decisions are synchronous, namely the leader selects places for his own facilities, where other decision-makers (investor) play the simultaneous and non-cooperative game, and according to Nash equilibrium, select the optimal location.

The leader uses new locations to optimize his objective function.Eventually, a numerical example is presented to test the model and a comprehensive sensitivity analysis is carried out to extract some managerial insights.